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A.  Introduction 
When  two  people  talk,  they  focus  their 
attention  on only a  small portion of what each of 
them  knows  or  believes.  Not  only  do  they 
concentrate  on particular  entities  (objects  or 
relationships),  but  they do  so using  particular 
perspectives  on  those  entities.  In  choosing  a 
particular  set of  words with which to describe an 
entity,  a  speaker  indicates a perspective  on that 
entity.  The hearer  is  led,  then,  to  see  the 
entity more as one  kind of thing than as another. 
For example,  a single building may be viewed  as an 
architectural  wonder,  a  house,  or a  home,  and a 
single  event may  be  viewed  at one  time  as  a 
selling,  another as a buying,  and still another as 
a  trading.  Some entities  are  central  to  the 
dialog at a certain point and hence are focused on 
more sharply  than others.  More importantly,  much 
of  what each participant knows  is not clearly in 
view at  all;  it is not  considered by the speaker 
in  choosing what to say  or how to say  it,  or by 
the hearer in interpreting an utterance. 
Focusing  is an active process.  2  As a dialog 
progresses,  the  participants  shift their focus  to 
new  entities or  to new  perspectives  on entities 
previously  highlighted  by  the  dialog. 
Furthermore,  an actor  is involved  in focusing  (as 
the term  is used in this paper):  if an entity is 
in focus,  it  is the object of someone's  focusing; 
it  cannot be  impersonally  in focus.  When I use 
the constructions  "highlighted",  "focused on",  or 
"in focus",  there  is  always an  implicit  actor 
doing the  highlightin  E or focusin  E.  Finally,  the 
entities that the  speaker and hearer focus on are 
entities  in  their  (external)  shared  reality. 
Focusing,  then,  is  the active process,  engaged in 
by the participants  in a dialog,  of concentrating 
attention  on,  or highlighting,  a  subset of their 
shared reality. 
The  relationship  between  language  and 
focusing  is  two-way:  what  is  said  influences 
focusing;  what is  focused on  influences what is 
said.  The  speaker  provides clues  for  the hearer 
both to  what s/he is currently  focused on and to 
what s/he wants to focus on next.  These clues may 
be linguistic or may derive  from shared linguistic 
or nonlinguistic  knowledge.  The hearer depends on 
I  The work  reported herein was  supported by the 
National Science  Foundation under  Grant  No.  MCS 
76-22004 and  by  the Advanced  Research  Projects 
Agency of the Department of Defense  under Contract 
No.  N00039-78-C-0060.  I would like to thank Jerry 
Hobbs,  David  Levy,  Ann  Robinson,  Jane  Robinson, 
Candy  Sidner,  and Brian Smith  for  discussing the 
ideas in  this  paper  and commenting  on  various 
drafts of it. 
2  This is  the reason the  verb "focusing"  rather 
than the  noun "focus"  is used  most often in this 
paper. 
shared beliefs about  what entities are highlighted 
to interpret  such  things as the appropriate  sense 
of  a particular  word  and  the object  or  event 
corresponding  to a definite description.  The link 
between the entities discussed  in an utterance  and 
the entities  focused  on  when the  utterance  is 
spoken  is  thus  an  important  aspect  both  of 
producing and of interpreting  that utterance. 
The  use  and  interpretation  of  definite 
descriptions  in  dialog demonstrate  the importance 
of focusing  to dialog  participants. 3 This  paper 
examines  the relationship  between  focusing  and 
definite description  and the implications  of this 
relationship  for  computer  systems  for  dialog 
understanding.  Section B presents an example  that 
illustrates  this  relationship.  Section  C 
discusses  definite  descriptions  from  both  the 
speaker's  and  the  hearer's  perspectives  and 
presents problems  that arise  for both participants 
whose  solutions  are  influenced  by  how  the 
participants  are focused.  Section  D  addresses 
some  problems  that  arise  in  oomputationally 
capturing  the  notion  of focusing  and  discusses 
other  aspects  of  dialog  with  which  focusing 
mechanisms  must  be  coordinated  in  a  natural 
language processing  system,  in order to handle the 
problems introduced  in the preceding  sections. 
B.  An Exampl~ 
To  begin,  I want to  examine a sample dialog 
between  two people,  an expert  and an apprentice, 
cooperating to  complete a  task.  It  illustrates 
several important aspects  of the role of focusing 
in communication.  The  sample comes  from a corpus 
of  task-oriented  dialogs  collected in situations 
simulating direct interaction between a person and 
a  computer  (Grosz,  1977;  Deutsch,  1974).  ~  The 
particular  task  being performed  is disassembly of 
an air compressor. 
(I) E:  First you have to remove the flywheel. 
(2) A:  How do I remove the flywheel? 
(3) E:  First,  loosen the two allen head setscrews 
holding it to the shaft,  then pull it off. 
(4) A:  OK. 
(5)  I can only find one screw.  Where's  the 
other one? 
(6) E:  On the hub of the flywheel. 
(7) A:  That's the one  I found.  Where's the other 
one? 
(8) E:  About ninety degrees around the hub from 
the first one. 
(9) A:  I don't understand.  I can only find one. 
Oh wait,  yes I think I was on the wrong 
wheel. 
3  Although  I will concentrate  on dialog,  much of 
what  I have to say carries over to other forms of 
discourse. 
4  For  most  of  these  dialogs  the  expert  and 
apprentice had only limited visual contact. 
96 (10) E: 
(11)  A: 
(12) 
(13)  E: 
(14) A: 
(15) E: 
(16) A: 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) E: 
(20)  A: 
(21) E: 
(22)  A: 
(23)  E: 
(24)  A: 
(25) E: 
Show me what you are doing. 
I was on the wrong wheel and  I can  find 
them both now. 
The  tool  I have is awkward.  Is there 
another  tool  that  I could  use instead? 
Show me  the tool  you are using. 
OK. 
Are you  sure  you are using the right  size 
key? 
I'll  try some others. 
I found  an angle  I can get at it. 
The  two screws  are loose,  but  I'm having 
trouble getting  the wheel off. 
Use  the wheelpuller.  Do you know how to 
use it? 
No. 
Do you know what it looks  like? 
Yes. 
Show it  to meplease. 
OK 
Good.  Loosen  the screw in  the center  and 
place  the  jaws  around  the hub  of the 
wheel,  then tighten  the screw onto the 
center  of the shaft.  The wheel  should 
slide off. 
First,  consider  the  use of  the phrase  "the 
two screws"  in  (18)  to refer  to the two setscrews 
holding  the  pulley on its shaft and the use of the 
phrases  "the  screw  in the center"  and "the  screw" 
in  (25)  to refer  to a part  of the wheelpuller. 5 
Since  most  objects  do  not  have  proper  names, 
definite  descriptions  are  a  primary  means  of 
identifying  objects.  However,  as in this dialog, 
the  same  description  may  be  used  to  identify 
different  objects  at different  times.  When  (25) 
was  uttered,  the  two  screws  mentioned  in  (3) 
through  (18)  were  the  most  recently  mentioned 
objects  that could be referred  to by a  phrase  such 
as "the screw",  but  they were no longer  focused  on 
by the  dialog  participants  -- they were no longer 
relevant  to either  the dialog  or the task -- and 
hence were  not considered  as possible  referents 
for  either  "the  screw  in  the center"  or  "the 
screw"  in  (25). 
One  can  see in  this example  that the  most 
recently  mentioned  object  that  satisfies  a 
description  may not  be  the  object identified  by 
that description.  What  entities  a  speaker  and 
hearer  are  focused  on influences  both the kinds of 
descriptions  they use and  how their descriptions 
are  interpreted.  In  utterance  (3),  the  expert 
indicates  that he  is focused  on,  and concurrently 
gets  the apprentice  to focus  on,  the two  subtasks 
involved  in removing  the  pulley.  In particular, 
the two allen head setscrews  involved  in the first 
task  are brought  into  focus;  they continue  to be 
in focus  through  the  first  part of  (18).  The 
initial  clause  of  (18)  indicates  the completion  of 
the  task involving  the  screws  and hence  suggests 
that  the apprentice  will  shift  her attention  to 
some  new task  (she might  not -- she could  still 
say  something  more  about  the  screws).  She  does 
5  The modifying  phrase  "in the  center"  does not 
distinguish  the  main wheelpuller  screw from  the 
setscrews,  but  from  other screws  that are part of 
the wheelpuller. 
make  such a  shift in  the  second  clause  of  (18) 
("but  I'm having  trouble getting  the  wheel off"). 
In  (19),  the expert  indicates  that be has  followed 
this  shift  (note  that he  might  have  asked  a 
question  about  the  screws  -- e.g.,  "How loose  are 
they?"  -- and  thereby continued  to  focus  on them 
and  the associated  task)  and narrows  focusing  from 
the  task of  removing  the  flywheel  to a  particular 
tool  involved  in that  task.  In this context,  it 
is clear  that  the  phrase  "the  screw"  cannot  refer 
to either  of  ~he  setscrews,  but must  refer  to 
something  else. 
This  dialog  also indicates  some  of the ways 
in which focusing  is manipulated  in a  dialog.  In 
particular,  it  illustrates  how  the structure  of 
the  entities  being  discussed  (the  'domain') 
influences  focusing  and hence  the structure  of the 
discourse.  The dialog  concerns  the performance  of 
a  task;  its  topic  is that task.  As a result,  the 
way in which  the apprentice  and expe~t  focus,  and 
hence  the structure  of the  dialog, Y are  closely 
linked  to the  structure  of the task.  Information 
about  the  structure  of  entities  in  the  domain 
provides  one  kind  of clue  to how  focusing  can 
change.  What  about  general  linguistic  clues  to 
focusing?  What information  in words  themselves  or 
in sentence  structure  can influence  focusing?  The 
use  of "but"  in  (18)  illustrates  one  kind  of 
linguistic  clue  to  focus.  The  indication  of 
contrast  suggests  a shifting  of  focus  to  the 
entities  described  in  the clause  following  the 
"but".  In  fact,  this  shift  does  occur  and  the 
remainder  of the  fragment  concerns  things  involved 
with  "getting  the wheel  off".  V 
The  final point  I want  to make with respect 
to  this fragment  concerns  the relationship  between 
how the  speaker  and  hearer  are  focused and  how 
differences  in  focusing affect  understanding.  It 
is  clearly  crucial  for  speaker  and  hearer  to be 
able  to distinguish  their own  beliefs  from each 
other's.  What about  focus?  I  am concerned  here 
not with  the  consistent  difference  in  focusing 
6 It  is interesting  that some  people  who are not 
familiar  with  the compressor  or wheelpuller  find 
this sequence  confusing:  (18)  seems  to  end  any 
concern  with  screws  and  hence  (25)  is 
unintelligible.  One must  know  --  or  infer  --  that 
the  wheelpuller  has a  screw  for  the statement  to 
make  sense. 
7 The  concept  of structure  used here is similar  to 
that  in Levy  (1977),  but  different  from that in 
work on story and text grammars  (cf.  vanDijk  1972; 
Rumelhart  1975).  In  particular,  I  am  not 
interested  in  such  things  as  generating  or 
recognizing  a  valid  dialog  (the  analogy  to 
sentence  grammars),  but rather  in those  dynamic 
aspects  of intersentential  relationships  such as 
focusing  that influence  the  interpretation  and 
generation  of utterances  in a dialog. 
8  One  of the key  open problems  for incorporating 
focusing  mechanisms  in natural  language  processing 
systems  is  identifying  the  different  kinds  of 
clues  to  focusing  and  how they  interact.  Some 
aspects  of  this  problem  are  discussed  in 
Section  D. 
97 that  results  from the  speaker  being one  step ahead 
of the  hearer  (closing  this gap is one goal of an 
utterance),  but  rather  with  whether  speaker  and 
hearer  purposely  maintain  differences  in focusing 
over  several  interactions  (as  they  do  with 
beliefs).  An analysis  of the dialogs  we collected 
indicates  that,  in  most cases,  whether  or not a 
speaker  and  hearer  are  focused  similarly,  they 
speak  as.  though  they  were.  Speaker  and  hearer 
assume  a common  focus;  they usually  do not have 
distinct  models of each other's  focus.  That  is, 
the  speaker  assumes  that  the  hearer  in 
understanding  an  utterance  has followed  any shift 
in  focus  indicated  by that utterance  and is,  to 
the extent  it matters,  focused  on the entities  the 
speaker  intended  (from the perspective  the speaker 
intended).  It  is  only  when  a  difference  in 
focusing  results  in  some  fairly  major 
incompatibility  that a problem  is detected.  The 
interchange  in  (5)  through  (11)  illustrates  what 
happens  when  the  two  participants  in  a  dialog 
believe  erroneously  that they are  focused  on the 
same  entity.  Initially,  the apprentice  is focused 
on  the motor  pulley,  which  she thinks  is  the 
flywheel.  Because  the expert  is not aware of this 
(he  probably  doesn't  even  consider  the 
possibility),  his responses  are not very helpful. 
C.  Description~ 
One  of the key ways  in which the influence  of 
focusing  on dialog  is manifest  is in the definite 
descriptions  used.  There is a  two-way  interaction 
between  definite  descriptions  and focusing:  what 
entities  a  speaker  and hearer  concentrate  on  (and 
from  what  perspectives)  influences  how  they 
describe  entities,  and how entities  are described 
influences  how the  speaker  and hearer  continue  to 
focus  their  attention.  Two  specific  problems 
relating  to descriptions  are strongly  influenced 
by  focusing.  From  the  speaker's  perspective, 
there  is  the  problem  of  what  to include  in  a 
description.  From the bearer's  perspective,  there 
is  the problem  of  what to do  when a description 
doesn't  correspond  to  any known  entity,  when it 
doesn't  "match"  anything. 
1.  Generating  Descriptions 
Three  factors  that  influence  the 
production  of a description  are:  the  information 
speaker  and hearer  share about  the entity being 
described,  the perspectives  they have  on it,  and 
the use  of  redundancy.  The  following  fragment  of 
dialog  illustrates  the  first  two  of  these 
factors. 9 
E:  OK.  Now we need to attach the conduit  to 
the motor.  The  conduit  is the covering 
around .the wires that you ~=~were 
working  with earlier.  There is a  small 
part ~  . . . oh brother 
A:  Now wait a  s  . . . the conduit  is the cover 
to  the wires? 
E:  Yes and  . . . 
9 This  segment  also  illustrates  the  cooperative 
nature  of  task-orlented  dialogs:  the  two 
participants  work  together  to achieve  a  shared 
goal  of identifying  the object  the expert wants 
the  apprentice  to locate. 
A:  Oh I see,  there's  a part that  . . .a part 
that's  supposed  to go over  it. 
E:  Yes. 
A:  I see  . .  . it looks  j~st the right  shap~ 
too.  Ah hah!  Yes. 
E:  Wonderful,  since!did  no_~know  how t_~o 
describe  the part. 
The  problem  that  arises here  is  that 
there  is no simple  shape-based  description  for  the 
object  the expert  needs to identify,  so he must 
find  some  other  shared  information  on  which  to 
base  his  description  (cf.  Downing,  1977; 
Chafe,  1977).  The  problem  is complicated  because 
the  expert and  apprentice  do not  share  a visual 
field.  If they  did,  the expert  could  point  (if 
they and  the object being pointed  at were all  in 
the same location)  or use relative  location  (~.g., 
"it's next to the red-handled  screwdriver"). "U The 
expert's  solution  in  this case is  to anchor  the 
description  on  the  basis of  a past  action  the 
apprentice  performed  and  then  to  describe  the 
object  functionally  (i.e.,  to  describe  its 
function  rather  than  its  shape).  Functional 
descriptions  often enable  bypassing  other  more 
complex  descriptions.  The  statement  "it is used 
for  doing x"  or  "it has the right  shape  for doing 
x"  may be used to  communicate  complex  shapes  and 
structures.  As  always,  the  success  of  such 
descriptions  depends  on the  hearer's  ability  to 
determine  what  such an  object  is like,  or to pick 
out  the object  from a  set. 
The  fragment  also  illustrates  the 
problems  that  arise when  two participants  in  a 
dialog  have  different  perspectives  on  what  is 
being  described.  The  expert's  orientation  is 
basically  functional;  he  has a model  of what  is 
going  on,  of how  the compressor  works,  and of how 
it  goes together.  His descriptions  are based  on 
this  model.  The  apprentice's  orientation  is 
basically  visual  or shape-based.  He  can see the 
parts and  can tell  by trying  whether  they  fit. 
This discrepancy  is  even  clearer  in the  following 
fragment,  where  from the  functional  perspective  of 
the expert  we  get  the descriptions  "pump"  and 
"cooling  fins",  while  from  the  shape-based 
perspective  of  the apprentice,  the  same  objects 
are  described  as  "thing with  flanges"  and "little 
ribby  things-: 
E:  Remove  the pump and the belt. 
A:  Is this thing with  flanges  on it the pump? 
E:  Point  at "the  thing with flanges  on it" 
please. 
A:  I'm pointing  at  the thing with flanges  on it. 
These  little  ribby  ~hings  are  flanges. 
E:  Yes,  the thing you are pointing  at  is the 
pump.  The  little  ribby  things  are cooling 
fins. 
In  this  fragment,  one  can  see the  expert  and 
apprentice  working  toward  a  shared  view,  trying  to 
10  Rubin  (1978)  describes  spatlal  and  temporal 
commonality  between  speaker  and  hearer  as  two 
dimensions  along  which language  experiences  may 
differ  and considers  how  these  dimensions  affect 
the interpretation  of deictic  expressions. 
98 establish,  or check  that they have establish@d,  a 
common referent  and hence  a common  focus. 11  An 
implicit goal  in a  dialog is  to establish  this 
commonality  -- the  effort this  requires is very 
clear  here.  One  of  the  ways  in  which 
misunderstandings  arise is  when the participants 
in a dialog fail to establish this commonality but 
think  they have  (this  happened  with the flywheel 
and motor pulley  in the initial dialog fragment). 
Not  only  do  such  mismatches  occur,  they  are 
difficult  to detect and often go unnoticed until a 
fairly major problem arises. 
A  further  problem  that  arises  in 
producing  a  description  is  deciding  how  much 
information  to  include in  it.  The  linguistic 
description  of an  object must distinguish it from 
all others currently  focused on by the speaker and 
hearer.  "~ But  the situation  is more  complicated 
than  this.  It is  clear from an  analysis of the 
task-oriented  dialogs  and  from  other  data 
(Freedle,  1972)  that  the description of an object 
seldom  contains  only  the  minimal  amount  of 
information  necessary  to  distinguish  it. 
Descriptions,  like the rest of language,  are often 
redundant,  lj  What  appears to  be  the  case  for 
physical  objects is  that the speaker describes an 
object not  in  the minimum  number of  'bits'  of 
information,  but  rather  in  a manner  that  will 
enable the hearer  to locate the object as quickly 
as possible.  Clear distinguishing  features  (e.g., 
color,  size,  and  shape)  are part of a description 
precisely because  they eliminate large numbers of 
wrong objects and hence help the hearer to isolate 
the correct object more quickly. 
The use  of redundant  information  (and 
not  Just  distinguishing  information)  to speed up 
the search for  a  referent can be seen easily from 
an  example.  If someone asks  "What  tool should  I 
use?"  the  response  "The  red-handled one."  may 
not be satisfactory even if there is only one red- 
handled  tool,  because  processing  such  a 
11  There  is a clear indication at  the end of the 
previous  fragment  that  the expert  realizes  the 
importance  of  shape  in  the  apprentice's 
orientation:  he  says  he  didn't  know  how  to 
describe  the  part,  apparently  meaning  that  he 
didn't have  a description  of its  shape  (he  did 
describe  it  functionally and in  fact that seems to 
have worked  Just  fine). 
12 Olson  (1970)  has  shown that the description  of 
an object  changes  depending on  the  surrounding 
objects  from which  it must be distinguished.  For 
example,  the same  flat,  round,  white object was 
described  as "the round one"  when a flat,  square 
object  of similar size and  material was present, 
but as "the white one" when a similarly  shaped but 
black  object  was  present.  The  importance  of 
contrast  for  distinguishing  objects  is  well 
established  in  vision  research  (e.g., 
Gregory,  1966).  Comparison  of  differences  has 
also  played a  crucial role  in computer programs 
that  reason  analogically  (Evans,  1963;  similar 
strategies  are used in Winston,1970). 
13 Olson,  1970, p.266,  comments on this phenomenon 
and on the need for further investigation  of it. 
description  requires  considering  too  many 
alternatives.  The  phrase  "the  red-handled 
screwdriver"  is  more helpful,  because it  limits 
the  search  to  screwdrivers.  In  giving  a 
description  that minimizes the time  it takes the 
hearer to  identify the  referent of  a  referring 
expression,  a balance must be  reached.  Too much 
information is as harmful  as too little,  since all 
parts of the description must be processed  to make 
sure the object  is the correct one.  Furthermore, 
the hearer may wonder whether he is mistaken  if he 
thinks he has determined  the referent but there is 
more description  to process  (cf.  Grice,  1975). 
Using  the phrase,  "the  red-handled  screwdriver 
with the  small chip  on the  bottom and  a  loose 
handle"  to  identify  the  only  red-handled 
screwdriver  will  probably  both  increase  the 
bearer's  search time and confuse him.  Rather than 
minimize either  the communication  time  (including 
processing of the  description)  or the search time 
alone,  the combination of  communication  time and 
search  time must be minimized.  A speaker  should 
be  redundant only  to the  degree that redundancy 
reduces the total  time involved in identifying  the 
referent. 
2.  Matching ~  Descrip~iQn 
As the preceding discussion illustrates, 
a major  role  of descriptions  is to  point;  the 
speaker is  directing  the hearer's  attention  to 
some entity.  For  the hearer,  focusing is crucial 
in  providing a small  set of items  from which to 
choose  that  entity.  Being  able to  so  restrict 
attention  is  necessary both  for identifying  the 
correct referent  (as  the interpretation  of  the 
phrase "the screw"  in the initial dialog fragment 
illustrates)  and constraining  search  time  (see 
Grosz  1977). 
One problem  that arises  for a  hearer, 
especially  a  computer  system  in  the  role  of 
hearer,  is what to  do when a  reference does not 
correspond  to  (or match)  any known entity.  If the 
description  suffices to  distinguish  the  entity 
being  pointed at  from others  that are currently 
focused on,  then the  mismatch does  not  matter. 
But,  what does "suffice  to distinguish"  mean?  The 
question  of what kind of  mismatch is significant 
depends  on more than the  entities in focus.  For 
example,  the difference between  yellow and green 
may not matter  when a yellow-green  shirt is being 
distinguished  from a  red one;  it does matter when 
picking lemons. 
In  addition,  the  hearer  must  decide 
whether or  not an  inexact match  should even  be 
considered.  In  the  usual  use  of  definite 
descriptions,  to  identify  some  entity  in  the 
domain of  discourse,  inexact  matches are  always 
acceptable.  Donellan  (1966)  distinguishes  this 
referential  use from  an attributive  use for  which 
an  inexact  match  is  not  possible:  "In  the 
attributive  use,  the  attribute of  being the so- 
and-so  is all  important,  while it is  not in the 
referential  use"  (p. I02).  But  the distinction in 
the terms that  Donnellan makes it poses a problem 
for  a hearer,  since it is t~  speaker's intent and 
not  the speaker's  beliefs  "~  that  distinguishes 
99 attributive  from  referential  uses  of  a 
description.  This  means that the hearer (whether 
a  person or  a computer  system) must  be able to 
detect  this  intent.  In  certain  cases  (for 
example, descriptions of  entities that do not yet 
exist), the attributive  use is usually clear.  In 
using  the phrase,  "the winner of  the  1979 Nobel 
Peace Prize",  a speaker  is describing  a  person 
whose identity is not yet known; the~  is no other 
way to  describe that  person (yet).  I~  There  are 
other instances in which the distinction relies on 
knowledge  outside  the  dialog  in  which  the 
reference  occurs (in particular,  what the hearer 
believes  the speaker  wants).  It  seems that for 
this problem the  dialog participants must rely on 
the  potential  for  clarification  available  in 
further  dialog.  If a  hearer  misinterprets  an 
attributive use of  a description, the speaker c~ 
explicitly indicate the need for an exact match.  "v 
To summarize, the importance of focusing 
to  both the interpretation and  the generation of 
definite descriptions  comes from the highlighting 
function it  serves.  By separating  those  items 
currently  highlighted  from  those  that  aren't, 
focusing  provides a boundary  around the entities 
from  which the  entity being  either described or 
identified must  be distinguished.  For generation 
purposes, this  boundary circumscribes those items 
from which  the  entity  being described  must  be 
distinguished, and  thus  provides some  means  of 
determining when a description is complete enough. 
It is  useful for  interpretation in  providing  a 
small  set of items  from which to  choose.  If an 
exact  match  cannot  be found  in  focus,  it  is 
reasonable  to ask  if any  of the  items in focus 
comes  close to matching  the definite description 
and if so, which is the closest. 
D.  Focus in Discourse: Prospects and Problems 
The major implication of the role of focusing 
in dialog for a natural language processing system 
is  that  such  a  system  needs  mechanisms  for 
focusing.  In particular, suppose the system has a 
knowledge  base which  encodes the  portion of the 
world  the  system  knows  about,  and  that  this 
knowledge  base  contains  formal  elements  which 
stand for entities in that world.  Then the system 
needs  a means  of highlighting  those elements in 
its knowledge base that correspond to the entities 
14  "A  definite  description  can  be  used 
attributively even  when the speaker believes that 
some  particular person fits  the description, and 
it can  be used  referentially in  the absence  of 
this belief."(p.  111) 
15  There is, of course,  the possibility that the 
speaker meant  to say 1977, in  which case s/he is 
referring (wrongly)  to  an existing  entity,  but 
then we are back with the referential case. 
16 I  have ignored a third  issue that arises when 
considering a computer system for natural language 
processing:  the  formalism  used  for  encoding 
knowledge  in  the system  must  be  adequate  for 
handling  attributive  descriptions.  For  a 
discussion  of  this issue,  see  Cohen,  1978  and 
Webber,  1978. 
currently focused on and  must be able both to use 
this  highlighting (for example,  to interpret and 
generate  descriptions)  and  to  change  it 
appropriately  as  the  dialog  progresses.  This 
section  presents  several issues  that  arise  in 
constructing such  a computational  model and  for 
each discusses  what structures and procedures are 
needed and what research issues must be resolved. 
Grosz (1977)  describes  focusing  mechanisms 
incorporated  in  a  computer  system  for 
understanding  task-oriented  dialogs.  These 
include structures  for highlighting elements of a 
knowledge base,  operations on  those  structures, 
procedures that use them for interpreting definite 
noun phrases,  and procedures  for updating  them. 
The  implementation  provides  for  two  kinds  of 
highlighting, explicit and implicit, and uses task 
information  to  determine shifts  in  focus.  An 
explicit  focus  data  structure  contains  those 
elements  that are relevant  to the interpretation 
of  an utterance because they  have been discussed 
in  the  preceding discourse.  In  addition,  the 
focusing  mechanisms  provide  for  differential 
access  to  certain  information  associated  with 
these elements.  In particular, the subactions and 
objects  involved  in  a  task  are  implicitly 
highlighted  whenever that  task  is  highlighted. 
That is,  implicit fQcus consists of those elements 
that are  relevant  to  the interpretation  of  an 
utterance because  they are  closely con~$cted  to 
task-related elements in explicit focus.'" 
There  are several directions  in which these 
mechanisms must  be extended  for a  system to  be 
able  to  handle the  general  problems  posed  by 
focusing  and  definite  descriptions  in  dialog. 
First, the only clues to how focusing changes that 
have been  incorporated in  the system  are  clues 
based  on shared knowledge about  the structure of 
entities  in  the  domain  (in  particular,  the 
structure  of the task);  linguistic  clues and the 
interaction  between  different  kinds  of  clues 
remain  to be examined.  Second, the highlighting 
of  explicit  and  implicit  focus  are  used  in 
interpreting  definite descriptions,  but an exact 
match  is  required;  the  question  of  what 
constitutes an  inexact  match  has not  yet  been 
faced.  Third,  although  the  highlighting 
structures  provide  for  focusing  on  different 
aspects  of an  entity, the  deduction routines do 
not use  this information in accessing information 
about  an entity in focus.  Finally, the question 
of  how  the  focusing  mechanisms  interact  with 
representations of  belief has not been addressed. 
The following  sections examine the problems posed 
by each of these extensions in more detail. 
17  Elements in implicit focus  are separated from 
those  in explicit focus for  two reasons.  First, 
there are  numerous entities implicitly focused on 
in  a dialog, many of  which are never referenced. 
Including  the  elements  corresponding  to  such 
entities  in  the explicit  focus  data  structure 
would  clutter  it,  weakening  its  highlighting 
function.  Second,  references  to  implicitly 
focused entities may  indicate a shift of focus to 
those entities,  making it  useful to  distinguish 
such references from others. 
i00 I.  Ranges  of Fo~usinK and  Clu~s to Shifts 
in Focus 
The term  focus  (as  well as  theme)  is 
sometimes used  (e.g.,  Halliday,  1967)  to refer to 
prominence  in a  sentence,  a more local phenomenon 
than focus as discussed  here.  It is clear that a 
speaker  and hearer are focused  not only globally 
on some set of entities but also more locally,  and 
that  this more local focusing  affects  the way in 
which  a  particular  idea  is  expressed  in  an 
utterance.  This  raises  the  question  of  how 
sentential  focusing interacts with the more global 
focusing  discussed in this paper.  When does the 
way in  which  an utterance  is phrased  not  only 
highlight certain  entities,  but  also change  the 
global  focusing  of the  dialog participants?  An 
answer  to  this question  requires  looking  more 
closely at  wha~akinds of clues  a speaker  can use 
to shift focus. "v 
A speaker's clues on how to focus may be 
linguistic  or may  come from  knowledge about  the 
relationships  among  entities  being  discussed. 
Linguistic  clues  may  be either  explicit,  given 
directly  by certain words,  or implicit,  deriving 
from  sentential  structure  or  from  rhetorical 
relationships  between sentences.  In  the  model 
described in Grosz  (1977),  both implicit  focus and 
the procedures  for shifting  focus are  based  on 
clues that  derive  from  knowledge a  speaker  and 
hearer  share about  the structure  of the entities 
being discussed;  they  use a representation  of the 
task to decide when  and how to shift focus. 19 For 
the focus mechanisms  to be useful  for  discourse  in 
general,  they  must be  extended  to  handle  the 
linguistic  clues  that a  speaker  may  use.  In 
particular,  two kinds of implicit  linguistic  clues 
must be  understood  and  their use  for  shifting 
formalized. 
First,  there are  the global linguistic 
clues that  come  from patterns  of  relationships 
between  sentences,  such  as  paraphrase  and 
elaboration  (Grimes,  1975;  Halliday  and 
Hasan,  1976).  For example,  by elaborating on some 
element  of a sentence,  a  speaker shifts focus  to 
that element  (really  the entity expressed by that 
element).  A  major  question  here  is  how  to 
recognize  when  such  patterns  occur  (cf. 
Hobbs  1976).  Perhaps more important,  there is the 
question  of  whether  recognizing  the  patterns 
requires knowing how the focus of attention  in the 
18  It is  important  to  note that  shifting  and 
focusing are not  separable tasks.  Focusing is an 
ongoing  process  that  both  influences  and  is 
influenced  by  the interpretation  of an utterance. 
This  dynamic  aspect  of focusing is  clear in the 
interpretation  of  the  phrase  "one  screw"  in 
utterance  (5) of the initial dialog fragment.  The 
focusing  established  by  the  expert  in 
utterance  (3)  highlights  a set  of  screws  from 
which the one  screw can be chosen.  The reference 
to  one  screw  shifts  focus  to  the  particular 
subtask of loosening those screws. 
19 The structure need  not be that of a task.  For 
example,  in  describing a  house,  focus  can  move 
from  the total house  to one of the  rooms of the 
house. 
two sentences  is related.  It may  be that  such 
global  patterns  are  more  useful  in  setting 
expectations  about  where focus  may  be  in  the 
following utterances than in determining  the focus 
in a particular utterance. 
The  second kind of  implicit clue comes 
from  the  syntactic  form  of  an  utterance. 
Sidner  (1978)  presents  rules  for  determining 
focus,  based  on  syntactic  structure.  A 
particularly  important aspect of her work involves 
the recognition  that focusing is only predicted by 
a  single utterance and that  the "expected  focus" 
must be  confirmed  by succeeding utterances.  That 
is,  the question of whether  an utterance changes 
global  focus cannot  be answered on  the basis of 
the individual  utterance.  Rather,  an  utterance 
can  only suggest  a global shift  in focus.  This 
expectation  may then be confirmed  in a following 
utterance  (if the speaker  continues;  if the hearer 
speaks  next s/he  may choose to  accept or reject 
this shift). 
2.  Inexact  Matches:  The  Problems  that 
Remain 
Before the  focusing mechanisms  can  be 
extended  to  handle  inexact  matches  two  major 
problems must  be  addressed:  determining  how  to 
decide  whether an  inexact match  is close enough 
and determining how to decide between accepting an 
inexact  match and  considering a  shift in focus. 
For the first  problem,  focusing makes it possible 
to determine  the  closest match,  but not to decide 
whether that match  is close enough.  For example, 
if a red ball and  a green ball are in focus,  then 
the  red  ball  comes  closest  to  matching  the 
description  "the red block"  but  not close enough 
to be considered  the referent of that phrase.  For 
the second problem,  if no exact match can be found 
in explicit  focus  the matching  procedures  must 
decide whether to accept a referent that inexactly 
matches  a  description  or  to  consider  the 
possibility that  the speaker  wants to  focus  on 
some new  entity.  For  example,  should  a  hearer 
confronted  with the phrase "the  red spot"  in the 
situation  Just described  look for  a  red spot on 
one of  the  balls?  Answers to  these  questions 
require research  on  some fundamental  issues  in 
semantics and on speech errors. 
3-  Focusing an  d Perspective 
Focusing  involves not only highlighting 
certain entities,  but also  highlighting  certain 
ways  of viewing  those entities.  For example,  a 
doctor  may be viewed  as a member  of the medical 
profession  or as having  a role in  a family.  In 
the  process  of  focusing  on  some  entity,  the 
speaker also chooses a certain perspective  on that 
entity  and,  as  a result,  focuses  on that entity 
from that perspective  (Halliday,  1977; 
i01 Fillmore,  197720). 
The perspective  from which an entity is 
viewed influences  how further  information  about 
that entity  is accessed.  The representation  of 
focus  presented  in  Grosz (1977)  allows  for 
differential access  to properties  of an  entit~ 
but this addresses only one part of the problem.  =" 
Using the initial perspective from which an entity 
is  viewed for  differential access  does not rule 
out considering a concept differently from the way 
it has already been portrayed.  Instead, it orders 
the way in which  aspects of the concept are to be 
examined.  One  of  the  problems this  raises  is 
deciding when to consider a switch in perspective, 
when  to abandon deriving  properties or searching 
items implicitly focused by an initial perspective 
and examine other aspects of the entity. 
Another  problem  that  relates  to 
perspective  is  how  perspective  influences  the 
particular description  a speaker  chooses.  Does 
global  focus give  an indication to  a speaker of 
which  properties  to  choose?  The  preceding 
fragments  of dialog  contained  several  examples 
that illustrated the  effect of differences in how 
a  speaker  and  hearer  were  focused  on 
communication.  This  suggests  that  focusing, 
though often quite  useful, can cause problems for 
people;  similar problems may be  unavoidable in a 
natural language processing system. 
4.  Focusing and  Beliefs 
An  additional aspect of  focus that has 
not  yet been addressed is  its interaction with a 
representation  of beliefs.  The dialog fragments 
in the section  on description pointed out some of 
the problems that  arise when the two participants 
know  different  things  about  the  entity  being 
described.  It is important, then,  for a speaker 
to be  able to separate his  own beliefs from what 
he believes  his  hearer  knows or  believes.  It 
seems equally  clear  from the  dialogs,  however, 
that  focusing is  not one  of the  things that is 
separate for  the two  participants.  There  is  a 
pervasive assumption  by speaker  and hearer  that 
they  share a common  focus (this is,  in fact, an 
important part  of how  and why  focusing  works). 
The extension  that seems to be  needed here is to 
have  the  focusing mechanisms  interact  with  an 
encoding  of knowledge  that distinguishes beliefs 
20 Fillmore says, 
The point is that whenever we pick a word or 
phrase,  we automatically drag  along with it 
the  larger context or framework  in terms of 
which  the word or phrase  we have chosen has 
an interpretation.  It is as if descriptions 
of the  meanings  of elements  must  identify 
simultaneously .figure" and "ground". 
To  say it  again, whenever  we understand a 
linguistic expression  of whatever  sort,  we 
have simultaneously  a background scene and a 
perspective on that scene. 
21  Consequently,the  reference 
mechanisms did not use this feature. 
resolution 
(e.g.,  Cohen 1978)  rather  than,  as is  now  the 
case, with some uniform encoding of knowledge that 
does not distinguish between speaker and hearer. 
E.  Summary 
Focusing is the active process, engaged in by 
the participants  in  a dialog,  of  concentrating 
attention  on, or highlighting, a  subset of their 
shared  reality.  Not  only  does  it  make 
communication  more  efficient,  it  makes 
communication possible.  Speaker and  hearer  can 
concentrate  on a small portion  of what they know 
and  ignore the rest.  The  importance of focusing 
to communication  is clearly  demonstrated by  the 
definite descriptions  that  are used  in  dialog. 
For a natural  language processing system to carry 
on  a  dialog  with  a  person  it  must  include 
mechanisms  that  computationally  capture  this 
focusing process.  This  paper has  examined  the 
requirements definite  descriptions impose on such 
mechanisms, discussed focusing mechanisms included 
in  a  computer  system  for  understanding  task- 
oriented  dialog, and  indicated  future  research 
problems entailed in modeling the focusing process 
more generally. 
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